Economic Analysis of Transmission with Demand Response and Quadratic Losses by Successive LP

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Abstract—The growth of demand response programs and renewable generation is changing the economics of transmission. Planners and regulators require tools to address the implications of possible technology, policy, and economic developments for the optimal configuration of transmission grids. We propose a model for economic evaluation and optimization of inter-regional transmission expansion as well as the optimal response of generators’ investments to locational incentives, that accounts for Kirchhoff’s laws and three important nonlinearities. One is consumer response to energy prices, modeled using elastic demand functions. The second is resistance losses. The third is the product of line susceptance and flows in the linearized DC load flow model. We develop a practical method combining Successive Linear Programming with Gauss-Seidel iteration to co-optimize AC and DC transmission and generation capacities in a linearized DC network while considering hundreds of hourly realizations of renewable supply and load. We test our approach for a European electricity market model including 32 countries. The examples indicate that demand response can be a valuable resource that can significantly affect the economics, location, and amounts of transmission and generation investments and that the representation of losses and Kirchhoff’s laws are also important in transmission policy analyses.

Index Terms—Transmission Planning, Demand Response, Nonlinear Optimization, Successive Linear Programming.

I. NOMENCLATURE

Sets and indices:

\( H \): Set of hours, indexed \( h \) each represents a different combination of load and renewable output
\( I \): Set of buses, indexed \( i, j \)
\( N \): Set of generation firms, indexed \( n \)
\( K \): Set of generation technologies, indexed \( k \)
\( L \): Set of AC corridors, indexed \( l \)
\( U \): Set of DC corridors, indexed \( u \)

Parameters:

\( A_{ih}, B_{ih} \): Inverse demand function parameters
\( CX_i \): Annualized capital cost of AC link [€/year]
\( CY_{ik} \): Annualized capital cost of generator [€/MW/year]
\( CZ_u \): Annualized capital cost of HVDC link [€/year]
\( D_{ih} \): Fixed demand under no demand response [MW]
\( F_i \): Initial capacity of AC line [MW]
\( MCI_{ik} \): Marginal cost of generator [€/MWh]
\( NH_h \): Number of hours per year
\( P_u, R_l \): Percentage of active power losses of AC line \( u \) and AC line \( l \) loaded at maximum capacity

\( S_l \): Susceptance of AC line [p.u.]
\( T_u \): Initial capacity of DC line [MW]
\( W_{ikh} \): Maximum capacity factor of generator
\( Y_{nikh} \): Initial installed generation of firm \( n \) [MW]
\( \Phi_{il} \): Node-line incidence matrix of AC lines
\( \Xi_{iu} \): Node-line incidence matrix of DC lines

Variables:

\( a_{ih} \): Net injection [MW]
\( d_{ih} \): Forecast demand [MW]
\( f_{il}, f_{ih} \): Power flows on AC line [MW]
\( g_{nikh} \): Generation dispatch level [MW]
\( p^*_{ih} \): Locational marginal price [€/MWh]
\( t_{il}, t_{ih} \): Power flows on DC line [MW]
\( x_i \): Expansion, as percent of increase, on AC corridor
\( y_{nikh} \): Generation capacity addition [MW]
\( z_u \): Expansion, normalized such that 1 is the existing capacity, on HVDC corridor
\( \theta_{ih} \): Phase angle
\( \rho_{ih} \): Curtailed demand [MW]

II. INTRODUCTION

REAL-TIME or spot pricing of electricity, first proposed in the 1970’s by Schweppe [1], was originally foreseen as a mechanism to balance supply and demand in an energy marketplace. Since then, most electricity markets around the world have implemented some form of spot pricing. However, many of those markets (especially in Europe) have not implemented a nodal version of Schweppe’s spot pricing, preferring zonal or even copper plate constructs. Further, all these markets are largely or entirely one-sided, emphasizing generation scheduling and prices that reflect the marginal costs of generating power, with relatively little participation by the demand-side. Contrary to Schweppe’s vision of supply and demand being equal partners, consumers tend to be treated as fixed loads, rather than equal parties who can modify their loads and who can submit bids that can affect prices and reflect the value of consumption. This reflects the reality that short-term demand remains price-insensitive [2]. This insensitivity is because retail rates are often regulated and are not varied to reflect short-term system conditions, and furthermore most consumers do not have the controls or information that would enable them to respond to spot prices.

Nonetheless, although Schweppe’s original idea remains only partially implemented in current market designs, there has been a growing interest in mechanisms that will allow system operators take advantage of flexible demand resources. Today’s advances in smart metering technologies, together with the creation of business models for demand aggregation, enable more active participation by the demand side of the market. Some of the benefits of demand response are load shifting...
from peak to off-peak hours, reducing the need for peaking generation capacity; improved system reliability due to higher flexibility; and market power mitigation due to increased demand elasticity [3]. Furthermore, demand response can help operators cope with the variability of large amounts of variable renewable resources [4] [5]. For example, deferrable loads can reduce the need for backup or fast-ramping thermal generation that otherwise would have low capacity factors [6]. Demand response can take the place of other measures for managing renewable variability, such as storage or interregional transmission designed to take advantage of load and renewable diversity across space. Thus, power system planning and policy analysis need to account for how demand response affects the economics of generation and transmission additions, and how smart grid technologies can help to avoid costly infrastructure investments [7].

However, the transmission planning approaches used today usually take into consideration only two types of demand resources: narrowly focussed interruptible demand resources and load reductions due to energy efficiency measures [8]. Although energy efficiency can be treated as an exogenous modification of load, future demand levels under spot pricing will be also affected by spot prices, which in turn are impacted by generation and transmission investments, and therefore, should be treated endogenously. Another way in which present transmission planning approaches are simplified is that they usually assume an exogenous pattern of generation capacity that is not affected by the costs or location of transmission. That is, a scenario of the locations, fuel-types, and amounts of generation capacity is assumed, and then the cost-minimizing transmission configuration needed to deliver that generation is defined [8][9]. However, transmission expansion not only can lower dispatch costs, it can also decrease the need for building generation by improved siting, generation mixes, and exploitation of load/resource diversity to lower reserve margin requirements. To rigorously consider those benefits, transmission and generation expansion should be considered simultaneously in co-optimization models [10],[11], [12],[13]; one co-optimization study found that up to half of transmission’s benefits could be in the form of reduced generation investment [14]. In a vertically-integrated utility environment, co-optimization can be interpreted as a type of integrated resource planning; in an unbundled environment, it is instead a type of anticipatory planning, in which the transmission grid owner projects how the grid configuration might affect the response of generation investment and operations.

In this paper, we propose a model for co-optimizing investments in electricity transmission and generation capacity, taking into account demand response, Kirchhoff’s laws, generation intermittency, and quadratic resistance losses. Using a linearized DC power flow to approximate the effect of Kirchhoff’s voltage on flows through AC lines, we assume that both transmission and generation investments can take place in small increments. This is of course a simplification, since in reality line and generator capacities come in discrete sizes. However, this simplification allows us to avoid the use of integer variables, which permits much larger models to be solved; furthermore, such a simplification is not an unreasonable approximation when considering broad patterns of transmission and generation many years or even decades in the future. However, since line susceptances are proportional to line capacities (given the assumed voltage and conductor type), enforcing Kirchhoff’s voltage law (KVL) results in nonlinear model constraints. This nonlinearity can be avoided by assuming fixed PTDFs (as in [13]) or by using a transportation model and thereby ignore Kirchhoff’s voltage law altogether, but the resulting flows and interacting economics of transmission, demand response, and generation could be greatly distorted [15]. Another nonlinearity in our model constraints results from incorporating quadratic losses [16]. Thus, assuming continuous capacity variables still results in a difficult to solve nonlinear model.

The large scale of real world networks and the need to model the nonlinearities resulting from Kirchhoff’s laws and quadratic losses, together with the inability of nonlinear solvers to solve large nonconvex problems reliably is a challenge that we attempt to overcome by using successive linear programming (SLP) [17]. In general, a SLP solution strategy consists of solving a sequence of linear programs in which the nonlinear objective function terms and constraints of the original nonlinear model are replaced with first-order approximations around the most recent solution, and then the resulting LP is solved to generate a new solution. The process is iterated until convergence, which can be guaranteed under restrictive conditions that are unfortunately not satisfied by our model. However, as we explain below, rapid convergence is achieved for our model when we combine iterative linearization of the transmission constraints with Gauss-Seidel iterations on load (in which, like the Project Independence Evaluation System (PIES) algorithm [18], the most recent energy balance duals are used as prices and inserted into demand functions to update the values of load used in the LP). The main advantages of our approach are the possibilities of using out-of-the-box algorithms that can efficiently solve very large linear programs.

We test our approach on a European Electricity Market Model (a version of COMPETES [19]) for the year 2050 including flow-based market coupling of 32 countries, demand response, and intermittency in generation (based on the large scale renewable penetration assumptions of IRENE-40 [20][21]). From our examples, we observe, first, that disregarding Kirchhoff’s Voltage Law and/or quadratic losses in policy models can distort the recommended transmission and generation additions, and, second, that demand response can be a valuable resource that can significantly affect the economics, location, and amounts of transmission investments.

The article is organized as follows. In Section III we summarize the existing literature on transmission planning and demand response integration. Section IV describes the formulation of our transmission-generation-demand response co-optimization model. The formulation is first introduced as a market equilibrium between independent but interacting transmission, generation, and consumer entities; then an equivalent single optimization model for computing that equilibrium is presented, followed by the combined SLP/Gauss-Seidel computational approach. In Section V we describe our test-case, and the results for different scenarios are summarized in
Section VI. Conclusions are presented in Section VII.

III. LITERATURE REVIEW: APPROACHES TO MODELING NONLINEARITIES IN NETWORK OPTIMIZATION

There exist an ample variety of optimization approaches to transmission planning [22]. For computational reasons, AC power flows are often modeled using linearized DC approximations that disregard reactive power and ohmic losses [1]. Network optimization approaches that disregard Kirchhoff’s Voltage Laws can be purely linear (e.g. [23]), but this assumption could grossly distort transmission recommendations in networked transmission systems [24][25]. Mixed-integer formulations improve upon this assumption by including Kirchhoff’s Voltage Laws as linear disjunctive constraints [26]; however, this approach presents numerical difficulties when optimizing expansion of large scale transmission networks with multiple investment alternatives. We use a DC approximation of the application of Kirchhoff’s voltage law to AC lines (thus ignoring reactive power flows and voltage constraints), and we represent high voltage DC lines as having controllable flows.

The lossless DC power flow model, which is commonly used in transmission planning models, has been improved by modeling losses assuming they are either proportional to line flow, a piecewise linear function of flow, or a quadratic function of flow [16]. Some models with losses optimize transmission additions using an objective function that minimizes the cost of investments and losses (e.g. [27][28][29]). However, those approaches assume an exogenous cost of losses, ignoring how the generation system is operated and the resulting marginal sources of generation in different hours. Other approaches seek to minimize the cost of transmission investments and operating costs by modeling power losses and generation dispatch explicitly in the system’s constraints. Linear approximations (e.g., [30]) ignore the dependence of losses on line loading conditions, an assumption that can be improved using piecewise linear approximations in mixed-integer programming formulations (e.g [31][32]). None of those models consider demand response, and thus they disregard the potential cost savings from the implementation of demand response programs that can take advantage of short-term price signals. Hence, our model improves on these approaches by combining the quadratic loss formulation (as in Appendix A of [1] or [16]) with elastic demand functions.

As illustrated in [5], the availability of short-term demand response can shift some electric loads from peak to off-peak hours, thereby reducing the need for investments in peaking generation. The benefits of demand response programs in transmission planning have been analyzed treating demand response exogeneously, considering various load profile scenarios (e.g. [33]). However, in reality, shifts in electricity consumption would result from the interaction between demand elasticity and spot prices which, in general, can be location specific (Lociational Marginal Prices, LMPs). To the authors’ knowledge, the only transmission planning models with endogenous consumers’ response are [34], for price-responsive demand, and [35], where load-curtailment programs are considered. However, those studies disregard transmission losses.

Our model is a large nonlinear program. The objective function is nonlinear, involving the maximization of total market surplus, which equals the sum of the (nonlinear) integrals of the demand curves minus the sum of (linear) transmission and generation costs. The constraint set is also nonlinear. Since it includes nonlinear equality constraints, the feasible region is nonconvex, which complicates computation and also means that a local optimum may not be globally optimal. Large-scale nonlinear programs such as this are much more difficult to solve than linear programs, which leads us to consider SLP. Successive linear programming has been widely used in other disciplines to find optimal or high-quality solutions to large-scale industrial problems [36]. Under certain conditions that our model does not satisfy, the algorithm has been proven to have superlinear convergence [37], and is guaranteed to converge. In the field of power systems, SLP has often been applied to solve AC optimal power flow problems [38] [39] and reactive power planning problems [40]. However, it has not, to our knowledge, been used for transmission planning in which transmission capacity is a decision variable, much less for transmission-generation-demand response co-optimization.

IV. MODEL DESCRIPTION

We describe our modeling approach in three steps. First we pose a market equilibrium problem for a single year that assumes perfect competition (price-taking behavior) among all market parties, including the transmission owner, generators, and consumers. Second, we state a single optimization problem that is equivalent to the market equilibrium problem in which the sum of consumer, transmission, and producer surpluses (market surplus) is maximized. Third, we describe the combined SLP-Gauss-Seidel algorithm we use to solve the optimization model.

A. Market equilibrium problem

A market equilibrium has two characteristics. First, each market party pursues its own objective (its surplus), and believes that it cannot increase its surplus by deviating from the equilibrium solution. This is modeled by formulating the maximization problem for each party (profit maximization for generators, consumer surplus maximization for consumers, and transmission surplus maximization for the grid operator), and then deriving each problem’s first-order (KKT) conditions. The second characteristic is that the market clears: supply equals demand for energy at each node in the network. The concatenation of KKT conditions for all market parties with market clearing equalities yields what is known as a complementarity problem, an increasingly common formulation of energy market equilibrium problems [41]. The complementarity model of this section can be viewed as a variant of short-run electricity market models in the literature (e.g., [16]) that include quadratic losses and capacity expansion, while assuming competitive rather than oligopolistic behavior. Complementarity problems can be solved either by specialized algorithms or, in special cases, by instead formulating and solving an equivalent single optimization model. We adopt
consumers in region.

price. The models below represent costs and revenues for a single year. This static representation can easily be generalized (at the expense of having a larger model) to a multiyear representation in which the timing of investments is also a decision.

First, we consider the generator’s problem. Each chooses generation production and capacity in order to maximize its annualized profits. Price is treated as exogenous (which is signalled by an asterisk *), consistent with our perfect competition assumption. For each firm n ∈ N:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Max} & \quad \sum_{i,k,h} NH_t (p_{ih} - MC_{ik} - g_{nikh} - \sum_{i,k} C Y_{ik} y_{nikh}) \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad g_{nikh} \leq W_{ikh} (Y^0_{nikh} + y_{nikh}) \quad \forall i, k, h \\
& \quad g_{nikh}, y_{nikh} \geq 0 \quad \forall i, k, h
\end{align*}
\]

where constraints (2) and (3) correspond to maximum generation limits and variable non-negativity, respectively. To account for variability of renewable output, W_{ikh} is a coefficient less than or equal to one that varies depending on the hour h, technology k, and location of generator i. This model can readily be generalized to include nonlinear production cost functions, ramp limitations, and other more realistic considerations, with the exception of unit commitment constraints that require binary variables.

Meanwhile, consumers at each location i choose demand levels d_{ih} in each hour by maximizing their net surplus, given by the difference between their valuation of the consumption (which is the integral of their demand curve P_{ih}(d_{ih}) = A_{ih} + B_{ih}d_{ih}, summed across hours) and what they pay for electricity (the electricity price p_{ih} times consumption). For consumers in region i ∈ I:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Max} & \quad \sum_{h} NH_t (d_{ih} (A_{ih} + B_{ih}d_{ih}) - p_{ih} d_{ih}) \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad d_{ih} \geq 0 \quad \forall h
\end{align*}
\]

Here we assume that cross-price elasticities are zero, only accounting for own-price elasticity. More general formulations can consider cross-price elasticities across hours [5] or pricing rules that average over zones or otherwise deviate from the pure LMP model [42]. We disregard the possibility of loss of load (unserved demand).

The grid planner and operator is modeled as a pool operator: it buys power directly from generators and sells it to consumers. The planner and operator is assumed to be a single entity, although in reality there are multiple operators (leading to seams issues) who can also be separate from grid owners. The operator maximizes the revenues obtained from this arbitrage minus the cost of losses and annualized expense of transmission investment.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Max} & \quad \sum_{i,h} NH_t p_{ih} d_{ih} - \left[ \sum_{l} C X_{l} x_{l} + \sum_{a} C Z_{a} z_{a} \right]
\text{s.t.} & \quad \quad \Phi_{il} (d_{ih} - r_l(x)(\frac{1+\Phi_{il}}{2} d_{ih}^2) - (d_{ih} - r_l(x)(\frac{1-\Phi_{il}}{2} d_{ih}^2)) + \sum_{a} \Xi_{au} (d_{ah} - \alpha_u (z_u) (\frac{1+\Xi_{au}}{2} d_{ah}^2) - (d_{ah} - \alpha_u (z_u) (\frac{1-\Xi_{au}}{2} d_{ah}^2)) - \alpha_{dih} = 0 \quad \forall i, h
\end{align*}
\]

Constrains (7) and (9) are Kirchhoff’s Current and Voltage Laws, respectively. (10)-(11) are maximum and minimum flows limits for AC lines, (12)-(13) are maximum and minimum flows limits for DC lines, and (14) is the non-negativity constraint.

Just for illustration purposes, we assume in our application that the quadratic loss coefficients are inversely proportional to the line capacities, approximated as \(r_l(x) = \frac{R_l}{P_l (1+x)}\) for AC lines, and as \(\alpha_u (z_u) = \frac{R_u}{P_u (1+x)}\) for DC lines. The factors R_l and P_u correspond to the fraction of active power losses when the lines are loaded at their maximum capacity (e.g., 5%) and depend on line lengths and characteristics. The term \(\delta > 0\) in the denominator of the definition of \(\alpha_u (z_u)\) is used to avoid \(\alpha_u (z_u) \rightarrow \infty\) if \(z_u \rightarrow 0\), since we are considering investment alternatives for new DC corridors. This correction term \(\delta\) results in a slight underestimation of the losses for \(T_u z_u << 1\). Note that our definitions of the quadratic loss coefficients for both AC and DC lines imply that doubling the capacity will cut transmission losses in half for a given MW flow over the line. It also implies that all AC line additions have the same voltage and conductor characteristics (per MW of capacity) as the existing line(s) in its corridor.

To complete the equilibrium model we need to define the KKT conditions for the above surplus maximization problems, and then add market clearing conditions. The KKT conditions are given in the online Appendix [43] for the generators, consumers, and the grid planner and operator.

\[\text{Note that in this model we only consider AC upgrades in existing corridors and ignore the option of building new AC links that would create new parallel flows in the system. The advantage of such assumptions is the continuity of the nonlinear optimization problem, which in our experience increases the likelihood of convergence of the successive linear programming approach to a KKT point in the following section. A system with new AC corridors that create new loops in the system present a physical discontinuity for extremely small line upgrades, since constraint (9) should not restrict the angle difference in the absence of transmission investments. As a result, the derivative of the constraint with respect to capacity does not exist when AC line capacity is zero, although this derivative is required by the SLP algorithm.}\]
Finally, the market clearing conditions in the equilibrium model correspond to the balance between transmission imports/exports, transmission losses, generation, and demand for each bus at every hour. The Lagrange multipliers of these conditions correspond to the market’s LMPs:

\[ a_{ih} + \sum_{n \in N} \sum_{k \in K} g_{nikh} = d_{ih} \quad (p^*_{ih}) \quad \forall i, h. \] (15)

The KKT and market clearing conditions together define a square system of complementarity and/or equality conditions, in which the number of conditions equals the number of variables [41]. This system could be solved for the market equilibrium by using commercial complementarity solvers such as PATH [44]. However, we take another approach, described in the next subsection.

### B. Equivalent Nonlinear Optimization Problem

We obtain the equilibrium by formulating and solving a single nonlinear optimization problem (NLP) whose KKT conditions are equivalent to the equilibrium problem (KKT conditions of all the market agents plus market clearing conditions).\(^3\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Max} & \quad \sum_{n,h} N H_h [d_{ih} (A_{ih} + \frac{1}{2} B_{ih} d_{ih}) - \sum_{n,k} M C_{nk} g_{nikh}] \\
& \quad - \sum_{l} C X_l x_l + \sum_{u} C Z_u z_u + \sum_{n,i,k} C Y_{ik} y_{nik} \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad (2), (3) \quad \forall n, (7) (14), \\
& \quad a_{ih} + \sum_{n \in N} \sum_{k \in K} g_{nikh} = d_{ih} \quad \forall i, h. \quad (16)
\end{align*}
\]

The objective can be interpreted as total market surplus. This is the sum of the objectives for generators, consumers, and the grid operator; note that all revenue terms (involving energy price \( p^*_n \)) from the objective functions of the individual player problems cancel, leaving only the integral of the demand functions minus all transmission and generation costs.

### V. SLP/GAUSS-SIEDEL SOLUTION APPROACH

#### A. Equivalent Nonlinear Optimization Problem

SLP can be applied directly to the above nonlinear program. However, we instead have had more success in achieving rapid convergence by using the PIES [18] approach of dividing the overall supply-demand equilibrium problem into separate supply and demand models, and iterating between the two. In the PIES approach, the supply model is a linear program that, given a tentative set of energy demands, determines (a) how those demands are to be met from the available supply as well as (b) a set of prices equal to the marginal costs (duals) from the supply-demand balances in the model. The demand model in PIES is simply a statistically estimated (or, in our case, assumed) set of demand functions that, given prices from the supply function, calculates a new set of quantities demanded (loads) to be used in the next iteration of the supply model. In our application, the supply model is a transmission and generation cost minimization model, subject to fixed demands \( D_{ih} \) that can be curtailed at cost \( \text{VOLL} \):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Min} & \quad f_t, \theta, x, z, a, y, g, \rho \sum_{l} C X_l x_l + \sum_{u} C Z_u z_u + \sum_{n,i,k} C Y_{ik} y_{nik} \\
& \quad + \sum_{n,i,k,h} N H_h M C_{ik} g_{nikh} + \sum_{i,h} N H_h \text{VOLL} \rho_{ih} \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad (2), (3) \quad \forall n, (7) (14), \\
& \quad a_{ih} + \sum_{n \in N} \sum_{k \in K} g_{nikh} + \rho_{ih} - D_{ih} = 0 \quad \forall i, h \\
& \quad \rho_{ih} \geq 0 \quad \forall i, h, \quad (18)
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \rho_{ih} \) is the curtailed load, which we include to ensure that there is a feasible solution of the overall model. For fixed demand levels \( D_{ih} \), the first order optimality conditions of this problem are equivalent to the KKT conditions of the generator’s and grid operator’s problems, and the market clearing conditions (19) for inelastic demand. Thus, a solution of the above NLP can be taken as an perfectly competitive market equilibrium subject to the assumed fixed loads. The duals for the energy balance (19) for each \( i \) and \( h \) can then be inserted in the demand functions to calculate new \( D_{ih} \) for use in the next iteration of the supply model. In this way, we can iterate between this NLP and the demand functions, and if the procedure converges, it is an equilibrium.

#### B. Successive Linear Programming

Large scale nonlinear optimization problems like the above NLP are computationally complex to solve. To overcome this, we describe here an approach using successive linear programming (SLP). In SLP, we solve the NLP via a sequence of linear programs where all the nonlinear functions are linearized by using their first-order Taylor series approximations. Abusing notation, if \( F(x) = 0 \) corresponds to the nonlinear constraints (i.e., (7) and (9)) in the NLP, the corresponding linear approximations at vicinity of a point \( x^k \) can be expressed as:

\[
F(x^k) + \nabla F(x^k) \Delta x = 0, \quad \text{where} \quad \Delta x = x - x^k.
\]

We impose fixed step size \( |\Delta x| \leq \gamma \) similar to Method II of [46] which converges quickly for our problem. We include demand response by combining the SLP for the fixed demand supply NLP with Gauss-Seidel iteration with the inverse demand function. The SLP algorithm combined with Gauss-Seidel proceeds as follows:

**Step 0:** Provide a starting point \( x^0 \) to initialize the algorithm. In our case, we generate the starting point by first solving the planning problem ignoring demand response and losses and only enforcing KVLs for the existing AC transmission lines.

**Step 1:** For given \( x^{k-1} \) and \( D^{k-1} \), solve the linear optimization problem subject to \( F(x^{k-1}) + \nabla F(x^{k-1})(x^k - x^{k-1}) = 0 \), yielding the primal solution \( x^k \) and dual solution \( p^k \) (i.e., electricity prices).

**Step 2:** Update demand \( D^k = P^{-1}(p^k) \) where \( P^{-1}() \) is the vector valued inverse demand function.

**Step 3:** Check convergence of the demand and objective function value of NLP (18) with tolerance \( \varepsilon \). If convergence is achieved, accept the solution \( (x^k, p^k, D^k) \), else set \( k = k + 1 \) and go to Step 1.

---

\(^3\)Formulation of an NLP may not be possible for general complementarity problems, but it is often feasible for problems formulated assuming perfect competition (see, e.g., [41][45])
If SLP with Gauss-Siedel converges to a solution that satisfies the second order conditions, it is a local optimum to the original problem NLP (16). Note that convergence is not guaranteed for this NLP, but in our experience, the approach has worked well.

VI. CASE STUDY: 2050 EU RENEWABLES DEVELOPMENT

A. Assumptions

We apply the approach of Section V-B to a large scale European market model COMPETES [19] including 32 countries. COMPETES assumes an integrated EU market where the trade flows between countries are constrained by Net Transfer Capacities (NTC). The model also includes wind and solar intermittency. Pre-calculated hourly intermittent variable renewable and hydro generation are taken as must-run in the model.

As initial capacities, we use the existing generation capacities from the WEPPS 2010 database [49] and the ten-year network development plan of ENTSO-E [50]. For 2050, we consider the Renewables Scenario (RES) of IRENE-40 [20][21]. In the RES scenario, the installed capacities of renewables and nuclear are taken as exogenous since investments/decommissioning for these technologies are assumed to be policy driven. Ambitious GHG targets and strong policy support are assumed to drive the deployment of renewable technologies. This includes large clustered offshore and onshore wind farms in the northwest, solar and wind in the south, and hydropower and biomass in central and northern Europe. Installed nuclear power capacity decreases to 115 GWe in 2050. In the inelastic demand case, electricity generation from various renewable energy resources amounts to 80% of total electricity generation in 2050 in accordance with ECF’s 80% renewable scenario [51]. We assume that only existing conventional power plants commissioned in/after 2010 are refurbished and operate in 2050 whereas older power plants are all decommissioned. Annual investment costs are estimated based on capital costs and economic lifetime assumptions in [19] for generation technologies and in [21][52] for transmission technologies. For demand response, we assume that the price elasticity of demand is -0.05.

We use a sample of 50 representative hours selected using k-means clustering [53]. The COMPETES model was solved using CPLEX 12.5 in AIMMS. Solutions were iterated up to 500 times to ensure convergence. The algorithm would stop early if the moving average of the objective of the previous ten solutions fell within 0.001% of the current solution.

Solutions were obtained within four hours on an Intel i5-2450M processor. The two primary cases considered below are the system with and without demand response. In addition, we have also considered the impact of omitting quadratic losses and Kirchhoff’s voltage law as sensitivity analyses.

B. Costs Savings with Demand Response

In both cases the total annualized cost is dominated by the plant operations (85% of cost), with 10% of the costs made up by generation capacity and the remainder consisting of transmission capacity costs. Total cost is reduced by 11.9% with the addition of demand response (Table I). A €14.4 B cost reduction is derived from generation savings; 82% of this reduction is from savings on operations, while the remaining 18% is from generation capacity reductions. The reduction in operations cost is mainly a result of shifting demand from peak hours. Net total electricity energy consumed decreases only by 0.15%. Transmission costs remained effectively constant between cases with a small net increase in costs resulting from a reduction in DC transmission of €6.9 M combined with an increase in AC transmission of €27.8 M. Demand response changes LMPs, as expected, with the increased prices during periods of low wind causing a shift of demand to times of more wind and lower loads.

C. Changes in Investment Decisions with Demand Response

The differences between investment decisions made with and without demand response are measured by two metrics (see Table II). The first metric, which is the normalized absolute sum of differences, captures changes on a line-by-line basis, while the second metric, the normalized change in additions, measures how the decisions change in the aggregate. If the magnitude of the two metrics is the same, it indicates that the siting of investments remained constant but the magnitude of investment at those sites changed, which was the case with generation capacity. Each metric was normalized by the total additions in the solution without demand response. In the case of AC transmission decisions the magnitudes of the two metrics differed significantly, indicating that there are significant shifts in the siting of lines. DC transmission decisions shifted but not as significantly as AC decisions. However, there was no spatial shifting of generation capacity, with demand response simply reducing the amount of generation investment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>New Gen</th>
<th>New AC</th>
<th>New DC</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No DR</td>
<td>104.49</td>
<td>13.21</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>121.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>92.63</td>
<td>10.62</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>107.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Generation Capacity</th>
<th>AC Transmission</th>
<th>DC Transmission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normalized Absolute Sum of Differences</td>
<td>26.10%</td>
<td>10.32%</td>
<td>3.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normalized Δ Additions</td>
<td>-26.20%</td>
<td>3.81%</td>
<td>-1.45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Albania and Serbia under demand response.

There has been a 400 MW addition between heavily invested in within both cases. The largest corridor to Belgium and the Netherlands. However, those corridors are reductions between Italy and Switzerland and additions between the demand response case with reductions of 15 GW of AC and 12.1 GW of DC capacity. The corridors with the most reductions are connected to buses where generation capacities are also reduced. The differences of greatest magnitude are reductions between Italy and Switzerland and additions between Belgium and the Netherlands. However, those corridors are heavily invested in within both cases. The largest corridor to be developed only in one case is a 400 MW addition between Albania and Serbia under demand response.

D. Spatial Changes in Transmission Investments

The shifts noted in transmission siting are portrayed in Figs. 1-2. With demand response, while the costs remained relatively constant, there was a net increase in transmission capacity, with AC capacity increasing while DC capacity decreased. Looking only at the locations of increased capacity relative to the no demand response case (Fig. 1), 32.5 GW of AC capacity and 5.5 GW of DC capacity was added. Most of the increased line capacity was located in Northern Europe. Fig. 2 shows corridors in which transmission investment was lower in the demand response case with reductions of 15 GW of AC and 12.1 GW of DC capacity. The corridors with the most reductions are connected to buses where generation capacities are also reduced. The differences of greatest magnitude are reductions between Italy and Switzerland and additions between Belgium and the Netherlands. However, those corridors are heavily invested in within both cases. The largest corridor to be developed only in one case is a 400 MW addition between Albania and Serbia under demand response.

E. Effect of Modelling Simplifications

The impact of not including losses or KVLs is explored by starting with a base version of the COMPETES model without resistance losses or KVLs, and then adding those features and examining how the costs change (Table III). In terms of percentages in each category of cost, transmission investments are affected far more than generation investments and operating costs. For some cost categories, losses have a bigger impact, while for others KVL is more important. The direction of impacts even differ. For instance, even though adding losses increase generation expenses, adding KVLs surprisingly decrease those costs (although the transmission cost increase more than makes up for that decrease). Also, it turns out that losses and KVLs interact with cost increases from adding both differing from the sum of their individual impacts when added to the base case. For instance, adding losses makes more of a difference in DC line investment costs in a model with KVL than in a model without; and adding KVL makes more of a difference in a lossy model than a lossless one. Further, DC investments increase while AC decrease when adding both because enforcing KVLs results in power traveling further on AC lines, magnifying their losses, thereby putting new AC investments at a disadvantage compared to DC lines.

VII. Conclusions

The inclusion of demand response, losses, generation co-optimization, and Kirchhoff’s voltage law all, help transmission policy and planning models more realistically model the economics of investment. Due to the complexity and computational burden, that those features add, they are frequently excluded from models, potentially distorting cost estimates and investment recommendations. We developed a practical method combining Successive Linear Programming with Gauss-Seidel iteration to co-optimize AC and DC transmission and generation capacities while considering demand response and system nonlinearities such as KVLs and resistance losses. We tested our approach for an electricity market model COMPETES which represents transmission among 32 European countries. The results indicate that demand response can be a valuable resource that can significantly reduce generation operating and investment costs. Although the cost of transmission investments are affected only slightly, the siting of transmission investment decisions changes significantly. Thus, the potential benefits of demand response should be taken into account in long-term transmission planning.
APPENDIX A

KKT CONDITIONS

The KKT conditions for each generation firm \( n \in N \) are:

\[
0 \leq y_{nik} + \sum_{h} \mu_{nikh} W_{ikh} \leq 0 \quad \forall i, k \tag{21}
\]

\[
0 \leq g_{nikh} \perp p_{ih}^u - M C_{ik} - \mu_{nikh} \leq 0 \quad \forall i, k, h \tag{22}
\]

\[
0 \leq \mu_{nikh} \perp g_{nikh} - W_{ikh}(Y_{nik}^0 + y_{nik}) \leq 0 \quad \forall i, k, h \tag{23}
\]

The KKT conditions for the consumers in region \( i \in I \) are

\[
0 \leq d_{ih} \perp A_{ih} + B_{ih} d_{ih} - p_{ih}^l \leq 0 \quad \forall i, h. \tag{24}
\]

The KKT conditions for the transmission grid operator are:

\[
0 \leq \bar{f}_{ih}^l \perp -\sum_{i} \chi_{ih} \Phi_{il} [1 - r_{i} (x_{i}) (1 + \Phi_{il})] \bar{f}_{ih} \tag{25}
\]

\[
0 \leq \bar{f}_{ih}^l \perp \sum_{i} \chi_{ih} \Phi_{il} [1 - r_{i} (x_{i}) (1 - \Phi_{il})] \bar{f}_{ih} \tag{26}
\]

\[
0 \leq \bar{f}_{ih}^l \perp \sum_{i} \chi_{ih} \Xi_{iu} [1 - a_{u} (z_{u}) (1 + \Xi_{iu})] \bar{f}_{uh} \tag{27}
\]

\[
0 \leq \bar{f}_{ih}^l \perp \sum_{i} \chi_{ih} \Xi_{iu} [1 - a_{u} (z_{u}) (1 - \Xi_{iu})] \bar{f}_{uh} \tag{28}
\]

\[
0 \leq \bar{f}_{ih}^l \perp \sum_{i} \chi_{ih} \Xi_{iu} [1 - a_{u} (z_{u}) (1 - \Xi_{iu})] \bar{f}_{uh} \tag{29}
\]

\[
0 \leq \bar{f}_{ih}^l \perp \sum_{i} \chi_{ih} \Xi_{iu} [1 - a_{u} (z_{u}) (1 + \Xi_{iu})] \bar{f}_{uh} \tag{30}
\]

\[
0 \leq \sum_{i} \chi_{ih} \Xi_{iu} [1 - a_{u} (z_{u}) (1 + \Xi_{iu})] \bar{f}_{uh} \tag{31}
\]

\[
0 \leq \sum_{i} \chi_{ih} \Xi_{iu} [1 - a_{u} (z_{u}) (1 - \Xi_{iu})] \bar{f}_{uh} \tag{32}
\]

\[
0 \leq \sum_{i} \chi_{ih} \Xi_{iu} [1 - a_{u} (z_{u}) (1 - \Xi_{iu})] \bar{f}_{uh} \tag{33}
\]

\[
0 \leq \sum_{i} \chi_{ih} \Xi_{iu} [1 - a_{u} (z_{u}) (1 + \Xi_{iu})] \bar{f}_{uh} \tag{34}
\]

\[
0 \leq \sum_{i} \chi_{ih} \Xi_{iu} [1 - a_{u} (z_{u}) (1 - \Xi_{iu})] \bar{f}_{uh} \tag{35}
\]

\[
0 \leq \sum_{i} \chi_{ih} \Xi_{iu} [1 - a_{u} (z_{u}) (1 + \Xi_{iu})] \bar{f}_{uh} \tag{36}
\]

\[
0 \leq \sum_{i} \chi_{ih} \Xi_{iu} [1 - a_{u} (z_{u}) (1 - \Xi_{iu})] \bar{f}_{uh} \tag{37}
\]

\[
0 \leq \sum_{i} \chi_{ih} \Xi_{iu} [1 - a_{u} (z_{u}) (1 - \Xi_{iu})] \bar{f}_{uh} \tag{38}
\]

\[
0 \leq \sum_{i} \chi_{ih} \Xi_{iu} [1 - a_{u} (z_{u}) (1 + \Xi_{iu})] \bar{f}_{uh} \tag{39}
\]

REFERENCES


